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PORTRAIT OF A PIRATE IN BRITISH MALAYA 
“It was a pertinent and true answer which was made to Alexander the Great by a pirate 
whom he had seized. When the king asked him what he meant by infesting the sea, the 
pirate defiantly replied: “The same as you do when you infest the whole world; but 
because I do it with a little ship I am called a robber, and because you do it with a 
great fleet, you are an emperor.” – St. Augustine1 
*** 
Eric Hobsbawm relates confrontations between the Mesazgi brothers 
and the colonial Italian government in Eritrea to paint a portrait of 
social banditry in Bandits. The following relates the confrontation 
between Capt. John Dillon Northwood, a 19
th
-century trader based in 
Singapore, with Si Rahman, an Illanun pirate. This encounter 
illustrates the social and Hobsbawmian nature of these incidents of 
piracy. This narration is drawn from Sixty Years: Life and Adventure in 
the Far East, written by John Ross in 1911. It is based on the author‘s 
access to letters written by Northwood.2 
*** 
Captain Northwood set sail for Singapore on his trading vessel 
the Lizzie Webber from Brunei sometime in the 1850s, his boat full of 
cargo, on a standard trip to the hub of British commerce in the region, 
Singapore. A few days sail from Singapore, he was approached by eight 
Ilannun prahus, the raiding vessel of choice for many natives of the 
region, shallow-drafted boats pulled by forty oarsmen to a boat. They 
appeared suddenly from a shallow bay, and had menacing intentions. 
Northwood, a veteran of the region, was aware that the area was known 
for piratical attacks by Illanun fleets, and prepared the boat and crew 
as best he could as the lead boat approached.  
The lead boat of the fleet of prahus pulled alongside the Lizzie 
Webber. On an exposed platform on the lead boat, a conspicuous figure 
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in a scarlet jacket hailed Northwood. The pirate chief was Si Rahman, 
and he was known as a notorious pirate in the region among British 
traders. Rahman urged Northwood to give up his vessel without engaging 
in a useless struggle, and informed Northwood that he wore magic charms 
that made him invincible in battle. Northwood refused, and the men of 
the Lizzie Webber shortly engaged in a pitched sea battle with the 
Illanun pirates: 
―…Captain Northwood himself was fighting his ship for aU [sic] he 
was worth. His great object was to bring down Si Rahman, who exhibited 
the most extraordinary daring — possessed as he was of the idea that 
his magic charm would preserve him from aU [sic] danger. There he stood 
on his platform, like a scarlet demon [the Illanun were known for their 
scarlet dress], directing the attack, and constantly exposed to a 
rattling fire, and somehow nothing could touch him. "For goodness sake, 
Meldrum, do bowl over that ruffian in the scarlet dress!" roared 
Northwood.  
…Meldrum [a passenger on the Lizzie Webber and a friend of 
Northwood‘s] methodically loaded his pet rifle and systematically 
potted at the scarlet Si Rahman — without the slightest effect. 
Northwood himself fired a few shots at him from his own favourite 
American smooth-bore carbine with the same result. From the main-deck 
and forecastle scores of shots were directed at Si Rahman without 
hurting him. The man was perfectly aware of the unavaihng [sic] 
attempts to bring him down, and openly rejoiced in the strength of his 
magic charm. It really seemed as if the charm was working to some 
purpose. Cassim, especially, tried the united effects of round shot and 
 
 
bags of bullets on his hated enemy, but while they took full effect on 
the crew of the prahu, nothing could touch the scarlet Si Rahman.‖3  
 
THE HOBSBAWMIAN BANDIT (AND PIRATE?) 
“Granted that piracy is really no more than robbery at sea, how did the crime come to 
acquire the aura of sinister glamour that still clings to it, an aura which sets the 
pirate apart from other and more commonplace malefactors?” – Edward Lucie-Smith4  
*** 
 Hobsbawm was a noted British Marxist historian who coined the 
term social bandit. He analyzed banditry from a socio-historical 
perspective in his work Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels (1960) and 
Bandits (1969). Hobsbawm‘s notion of banditry altered the accepted and 
holistic view of banditry as an extemporaneous form of primitive 
rebellion. Hobsbawm‘s ‗social‘ bandits are individuals who the state 
regards as criminals but who are regarded as Robin Hood-esque heroes by 
their society. 5 This paper will examine a maritime ‗noble robber,‘ or 
social pirate, and the nature of his communities in mid-19th-century 
British Malaya as compared to the communities of 21st century pirates in 
the same region.6  
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6
 Hobsbawm classifies social bandits in three categories: ‗noble robber,‘ ‗haiduk‘ 
(primitive guerilla fighter), and ‗avenger‘ (ruthless, vengeful fighter). The noble 
robber will be the focus of this paper as I examine colonial and contemporary pirates in 
Southeast Asia, specifically the nature of the social communities he is part of. 
Hobsbawm‘s noble robber is defined by nine traits: 
 
1. He is a victim of injustice; 
2. ‗Rights wrongs;‘ 
3. ‗Takes from the rich to give to the poor;‘ 
4. Kills only in self-defense or just revenge; 
5. Welcomed amongst his people; 
6. Admired and supported by his people; 
7. Dies only through treason; 
8. Is invincible or invulnerable; 
9. Is the enemy of the local oppressor. 
 
Ibid. 47-48.  
 
 
 
Hobsbawm relies primarily on Western examples to support his 
notion of social banditry. As it turns out, Southeast Asia, and 
particularly Indonesia‘s history is rich with examples of characters 
who share important traits with social bandits. These individuals span 
in time from the founders of the ancient Melaka kingdom to the peasant 
rebels under the Dutch to the World War II resistance fighters. 7 8 9 
Whereas some of Indonesia‘s more widely-known bandits have been labeled 
as social bandits by historians, Ken Angrok for example, fewer of its 
seaborne robbers-cum-heroes, Si Rahman for example, have been examined 
through this lens. 10  Moreover, despite an inclination that pirates, 
whether of a European, Caribbean, Somalian, or Southeast Asian variety, 
would be suited for such Hobsbawmian analysis given their 
stereotypically romantic nature (Captain Jack Sparrow in Pirates of the 
Caribbean, for instance, and modern Indonesian and Malay romances 
feature piratical heroes too), few historians have delved into this 
niche topic.11  
Pirates also warrant examination through this lens from an 
epistemological perspective, as piracy and banditry have similar 
connotations. Just as is the case for the Italian root, bandito, the 
original Latin-derived terms „peirato‟ and „peirata‟ connote inclusion 
or exclusion, respectively, from the traditional boundaries of 
states. 12 13  The earliest use of the English word pirate in the Oxford 
English Dictionary was within the political context of the ascending 
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nation-state during the early 15th century.14 In the case of colonial and 
contemporary pirates in Southeast Asia, they too find themselves 
operating at the fringes of state boundaries and polity. But if these 
individuals are excluded from traditional boundaries of states, what 
communities are they part of, and what is the nature of these 
communities?  
In this paper I will argue according to the firsthand account of 
James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak, it appears that piracy in the state of 
British Malaya was community-driven and egalitarian, led by the 
interests of heroic figures like Si Rahman, while modern-day pirates 
operate in loosely structured, hierarchical groups beholden to 
transnational criminal syndicates. Contemporary pirates do not form the 
egalitarian communities of their colonial counterparts or play the role 
of ‗Robin Hood‘ in their societies. Rather, the 21st century Southeast 
Asian pirate is a pawn in the increasingly corporate interest of 
modern-day criminal organizations. 
  
HISTORICAL PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA  
 
“This sea is infested with pirates, to meet whom is death.” – Shih Fa-Hsien, in reference 
to the Straits of Malacca in the early 5
th
-century CE
15 
*** 
Southeast Asia has been known for centuries as an area rife with 
piratical and maritime raiding traditions. The earliest known 
references to piracy date to the 4th and 5th century CE. These describe 
the area as ―infested‖ in translated Indian and Chinese works.16 As this 
paper delves into the history of piracy in Southeast Asia, and the 
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social nature of its perpetrators, it is important to first define 
piracy. 
‗Piracy,‘ both historically and presently, is laden with a 
variety of connotations. It ―…is a term that both describes and passes 
a (negative) judgment…‖ 17  For the purposes of this paper, this 
epistemological point must be clarified, and this paper‘s definition of 
piracy will be identical to the International Maritime Bureau‘s Piracy 
Reporting Center‘s (IMB PRC) definition. 18  This flexible and simple 
approach to the definition will allow for the comparison between these 
pirates and the social structures in which they operate. 
 These earliest references to piracy in the region are drawn 
primarily from the accounts of Chinese, Indian, and Arabic traders. 
Descriptions of these piratical maritime activities have only been 
documented sporadically, but these references as well as oral 
traditions suggest that maritime raiding has played a pivotal role in 
the regional social structures and survival strategies of local 
peoples.19 Consistent historical sources become available in the 15th and 
16th centuries as Western accounts of maritime practices come into 
focus. It is at this time that some of these maritime communities were 
described as perompak, a Malay word which means ―wanderers and 
renegades who included hereditary outlaw bands with no fixed abode,‖ 20 
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18
 The definition is ―The act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or 
any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that 
act.‖ 
 
ICC International Maritime Bureau, ―Piracy and Armed Robber against Ships. A Special 
Report. Revised edition – March 1998‖ (Barking, U.K.: International Chamber of Commerce 
IMB, 1998), 2.  
19
 Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies, 
26. 
20
 Carl A Trocki, Prince of Pirates. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979), 56.   
 
 
which suggests power structures similar to Hobsbawm‘s pre-capitalist 
agrarian societies.21  
 The diversity of maritime communities that inhabited the region 
from the 16th-19th centuries indicates the diversity of ethnicities and 
cultures which make up modern-day Southeast Asia. In varying degrees, 
many of these maritime peoples engaged in piratical activities. The 
maritime communities of this era can be broken into five groups: Bugis, 
Vietnamese / Chinese, Malay, Illanun, and Sea Dayaks. Most relevant to 
British sphere of influence were the Malay, Illanun, and Sea Dayak 
pirates.  
Malays were based primarily between Borneo and Aceh, and were 
most prevalent in the Riau Archipelago and the Straits of Malacca. 
Their governance system was based on what is described as a ―man of 
prowess,‖ where a central, charismatic leader emerged within a 
community, and bound followers to him to form a transient sovereignty 
that expanded outwards from his influence. 22  Piracy was a means to 
wealth, and Malays engaged in a cyclical nature of piracy dependent on 
economic trends, at times engaging in the collection of trade goods 
such as sea slugs, bird nests, or fish, and at other times pirating 
ships or enslaving other peoples for economic and political purposes. 
The vast majority was not full-time pirates, and as the British 
increasingly expanded their influence in the region, Malay political 
structure underwent what is referred to as ―decay theory,‖ or an 
accelerated power cycle; as this occurred, power and influence 
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 Hobsbawm, Bandits, 27-28. 
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accumulated to individual leaders rather than their political centers 
which faded in influence.23 
The Illanun were raiders from the Sulu Sultanate, a state that 
ruled over the islands of the Sulu Sea in the southern Philippines from 
the mid-15th to early 20th century. Illanun raids were widely feared by 
Europeans and locals alike, and were the most advanced and deadly of 
all forms of piracy in the region. Slave raiding was a significant 
driver of their acts of piracy. The Sulu Sultanate needed additional 
labor power to drive production of local commodities in their trade 
with China, and labor scarcity in their home islands increased the 
attacks in the Malay and Indonesian region through the 1840s.24 Even in 
modern-times, these raiders and the individuals in local maritime 
communities who fought them off, live on in Malay romances, popular 
folk epics, and dramas. 25  Warfare against the Europeans took on an 
honorable reputation for them as they increasingly interacted with 
them.26  
The Dayaks were early inhabitants of the island of Borneo, though 
according to oral tradition they arrived just a few generations before 
the British. The Dayaks began to migrate to the region of Sarawak 
during the 15th-century, and though there is little evidence that they 
engaged in sea raiding during this early period, by the mid-19th century 
they engaged in piracy. The Dayaks interacted with the local Malays in 
the region, and participated in their politics. According to Sandin, 
though, the Dayaks maintained the heritage of their social structure, 
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which entailed complex systems of long-distance inter-tribal warfare. 27 
It was at this juncture that European presence in the region began to 
be felt. 
 
EUROPEAN COLONIALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
“The inhabitants may be divided into three different classes, vis., the Malays, the 
Chinese, and the Dyaks; of the two former little need be said, as they are so well 
known…The Dyaks, by far the most interesting portion of the inhabitants…” – James Brooke, 
Dec. 10, 1841
28
 
*** 
From the 16th-century to the early 20th-century, England, Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, and France became colonial powers. European 
colonialism was typified by mercantilist policies that strengthened the 
home metropole, the inter-European power competition, and the 
development at the expense of the indigenous populations from which the 
colonial wealth was drawn. Southeast Asia was no different, and was 
primarily settled by the Dutch, Spanish, and British. While the 
Portuguese and Spanish were the first significant presence in Southeast 
Asia in the mid-16th century, by the 17th and 18th centuries the Dutch and 
British had grown their trading empires as the Portuguese and Spanish 
naval powers declined. The British grew increasingly influential in the 
region that is modern-day Malaysia. 
 The first British to become involved in the area were companies 
like the East India Company that sought to open up markets with Malay 
Sultans for trading in the 1770s. The first official British 
settlements on the Malay Peninsula were built in Kedah following 
negotiations with the local Sultan in exchange for military assistance 
against Siamese forces. The British expanded their sphere of influence 
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in the region through political strong-arming. By 1800, British trading 
posts had been established in Penang and Perai, which were renamed 
Prince of Wales Island and Province Wellesley respectively. 
From the 17th to early 19th-century, Malacca was owned by the 
Dutch, but during the Napoleonic Wars between 1811 and 1815, like other 
Dutch holdings in Asia, it became occupied by the British to prevent 
French incursions.  Following the end of the war the territory had been 
returned to the Dutch, but in 1824 due to increasingly tense relations 
over ambiguously-defined spheres of influence, the British and Dutch 
agreed to the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 which divided the Malay 
Archipelago into a British zone in the north and a Dutch zone in the 
south. The British Straits Settlements were officially established soon 
after in 1826 by the British East India Company, and this body held 
jurisdiction over all British settlements in the region, which 
eventually included the Sultanate of Sarawak on the Island of Borneo. 
Sarawak, and its ruler, James Brooke, are of particular interest as 
Brooke, perhaps more than any other British subject in the period, 
interfaced closely with piratical communities in the region in his 
efforts to combat them.  
 
JAMES BROOKE, THE WHITE RAJAH OF SARAWAK  
“My intention, my wish, is to develop the island of Borneo.” – James Brooke, December 31, 
1844
29
 
*** 
James Brooke (1803-1868) was a British adventurer who established 
the Kingdom of Sarawak in 1841 after receiving the land and 
jurisdiction from the Sultanate of Brunei to reward his efforts 
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assisting the Sultan fight piracy and insurgency. On September 24, 1841 
Brooke was bestowed the title Rajah and founded what was known as the 
White Rajah Dynasty of Sarawak, which survived Brooke by two 
generations until 1946 when Charles Brooke ceded the region to the UK.30 
Sarawak became a state of Malaysia in 1963. As described by Payne, 
Brooke is the only ―man [who] succeeded in coming from the West and 
making himself king over an Eastern race and founding a dynasty which 
lasted for a hundred years.‖ 31 Brooke did not rule from a mountaintop 
and engaged closely with the local peoples, personally administering, 
negotiating, fighting, and generally engaging in all facets of 
government administration. For this reason Brooke‘s writings are 
particularly insightful concerning the topic of local social 
communities. 
 Brooke first arrived in Southeast Asia from India in 1838, when 
he set sail for Borneo after inheriting £30,000 and subsequently 
purchasing a trade ship. When he arrived in Kuching, the capital of 
Sarawak, vassal state to the Sultanate of Brunei on the island of 
Borneo, the local ruler Pangeran Muda Hashim appealed for his 
assistance in putting down insurgent Malays and Dayak tribes. Brooke at 
first refused assistance, but returned in 1841 and agreed to assist 
Hashim. Following their successful repression of the rebellion, Sarawak 
and Serian were ceded to Brooke in gratitude. Brooke set out to 
establish an ambitious system of administration in the state, made up 
primarily of local Malays and Dayaks. One of his highest was ―the 
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extirpation of piracy,‖ and piratical communities which plagued the 
region and proved to be an ongoing issue throughout his rule.32 
 
PIRATE COMMUNITIES IN SARAWAK 
“The piracy of the Archipelago is not understood…because [the British government] cannot 
distinguish pirate communities from native states.” – James Brooke33 
*** 
The pirates whom Brooke faced while in Sarawak seemed to form 
independent communities outside the realm of the local sociopolitical 
power structures and challenged the state administration of Brooke. A 
local Malay state north of Sarawak‘s jurisdiction which, according to 
Brooke, typified the power structures of the region, is ―…in the last 
stage of decay and distraction, without internal power or external 
influence.‖ 34  Brookes goes on to describe the corrupt and ineffective 
governance of these hereditary descendants of traders from the Middle 
East who, alongside Malays, formed hereditary kingships who ruled Malay 
and Dayak subjects. 35 The decay that Brooke witnesses is appears to be 
evidence for the cyclical nature of power structures in the area, and 
in the mid-19th century as these central powers declined, new power-
holders were beginning to rise up. The new power holders were Malay 
traders who formed communities around river mouths. These are described 
as ―nuclei of political power,‖36 by Tarling, and indicate the transient 
and ambiguous nature of state lines in the period. Brooke‘s 
descriptions of his visits to these riverine communities as he sought 
                                                          
32
 James Brooke and John C. Templer, James Brooke to James Gardner, December 10, 1841, The 
Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of Sarawak: Volume 1, 172. 
33
 James Brooke and John C. Templer, James Brooke to John C.  Templer, April 10, 1845, The 
Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of Sarawak: Volume 2, 163. 
34
 James Brooke and John C. Templer, James Brooke to James Gardner, December 10, 1841, The 
Private Letters of Sir James Brooke, K.C.B., Rajah of Sarawak: Volume 1, 145. 
35
 Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism in 
Nineteenth-Century South-East Asia, 118. 
36
 Ibid. 3. 
 
 
to understand the locals and consolidate his administration seems to 
confirm this.37  
Brooke‘s descriptions of these river mouth communities portray an 
agrarian ethnic hierarchy, with the Malays at the top of the pyramid, 
primarily traders, and local Dayaks at the bottom as rice cultivators 
and hunter-gatherers. According to Brooke, the Dayaks were considered 
an inferior race by the Malays, and were subject to numerous taxes and 
various inequities. For example, if a Dayak wild boar trap injured a 
Malay, the responsible Dayak was required to compensate the Malay with 
two-thirds of his property. In contrast, Malays were not punishable by 
the rule of law for killing Dayaks. 38 Malays also held a monopoly over 
all Dayak trade goods such as beeswax and bird nests, and fixed prices 
in their favor. The Malays also subjected Dayaks to heavy rice taxation 
to the point where Dayaks were unable ―…to feed [their] families…and 
too often [were] reduced to a state of famine.‖39 The most serious form 
of oppression followed situations in which the Dayaks are unable to 
meet the taxes imposed by the Malays, in which case, according to 
Brooke ―the Dyak tribe is attacked and plundered, and their wives and 
children seized and sold as slaves.‖ 40 41  It appears that these 
communities rarely engaged in warfare, except in self-defense against a 
pirate raid or in the event of an inter-tribal Dayak feud, which 
sometimes included maritime raiding. This maritime raiding appeared to 
be less piratically driven than the cultural significance it held and 
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practices such as head collection. 42  In a letter to Templer in 1850, 
Brooke explains that while the dozens of river mouth communities do not 
wage war or raid other communities except in the case of Dayak tribal 
feuds, the piratical communities wage war and raid all actors in the 
region, and do not follow traditional Dayak feuding practices. 43 Brooke 
even goes so far as to describe his relations with other Dayaks in the 
region as ―excellent friends.‖ 44 According to Brooke, this hierarchical 
power structure characterized the majority of river communities with 
which he was familiar, except in the case of distinctly piratical 
communities he encountered. It seems, according to Brooke, that these 
piratical tribes which he describes do not fit within the typical power 
structure of the region. 
The Serebas and Sakarran Dayak tribes are given special attention 
in Brooke‘s letters, as distinctly ‗piratical tribes‘ which Brooke 
faced in the 1840s. The Serebas and Sakarran Dayak tribes had ―thrown 
off the authority of the Malays, [and] have turned pirates.‖ 45  This 
description seems to indicate that these Dayak tribes departed from the 
nuclei of power around riverine areas. According to his letters, 
Brooke‘s encounters with pirates are primarily from these two tribes, 
though he does reference a number of encounters with Illanun raiders; 
the engagement between Si Rahman and Northwood, a contemporary of 
Brooke‘s, is illustrative of what such an encounter might look like. In 
both cases, evidence from Brooke‘s descriptions seems to indicate that 
the Serebas, Sakarran, and Illanun were independent of the power 
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structures of both the decaying central Malay state and the more 
politically transient river mouth communities.  
When contrasted with descriptions of Dayak and Malay river mouth 
communities with whom Brooke had dealings, the nature of the Serebas 
and Sakarran as distinctly piratical appears to emerge. Serebas and 
Sakarran communities are described as ―forts‖ and ―towns,‖ their 
defenses as ―strong and well built.‖ 46  These settlements appear to be 
extremely mobile, and change locations as Brooke and his allies pursue 
them, in contrast to the more stable river mouth communities where 
Dayaks are primarily engaged in rice cultivation. 47  These piratical 
Dayak communities were not just made up of men, but included women and 
children of the pirates, who even joined the on their raids on 
occasion. 48  Brooke‘s frequent references to these distinctions between 
‗pirate communities‘ and ‗native states‘ that fall under the domain of 
the local riverine power structures seems to indicate communities that 
are structured distinctly from the majority of Dayak communities.  
Brooke does not include thorough descriptions of any illanun 
communities in his letters. He does however note that the ―…Lanoons are 
mere settlers on this coast,‖ indicative of the highly mobile nature of 
their piratical communities.49 Illanun raiders were known to begin their 
maritime journeys in September as an eastern wind blew across the Malay 
Archipelago in September. This was known as musim lanun, or ‗Illanun 
season;‘ also known as the pirate wind. 50  During this raiding system, 
the Illanun lived in small and compact settlements along the coast, 
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located near allied communities or coral reefs. These mobile 
settlements were formed around the charismatic leaders that led the 
raiders, members of the same mosque, or were familial in nature.51 
 
THE EGALITARIAN NATURE OF SARAWAK’S PIRATE COMMUNITIES 
“My intention, my wish, is to extirpate piracy by attacking and breaking up the pirate 
towns – not only pirates direct, but pirates indirect.” – James Brooke, Dec. 31 184452 
*** 
These descriptions of Brooke of these distinct communities of 
piratical Dayaks and Illanun seems to indicate an egalitarian nature 
that is not evident in the hierarchical social structures of other 
nearby communities. Their apparent ethnic composition further 
distinguished them. For example, referring to Serebas and Sakkarans in 
northern Borneo, Brooke describes the northern part of the island as 
―inhabited by a number of piratical communities, formed from a mixture 
of the surrounding countries,‖ and describes the power of the central 
Borneon government as ―scarcely recognized‖ in this area. 53  He notes 
that some Malays and Bugis are part of these primarily Dayak 
communities, and are ―notorious‖ within the Dayak communities for their 
shared piratical habits. 54  It appears that these communities were of 
mixed ethnicity, which contrasts sharply with Brooke‘s descriptions of 
the agrarian communities which seemed to be governed by a strict ethnic 
hierarchy.  
The egalitarian nature of these communities is further elucidated 
by descriptions of the breakdown of goods taken following a successful 
pirate raid. Sheriff Sahib, an Arab leader, is a frequently referenced 
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adversary of Brooke‘s, and an ally of the Serebas and Sakarran tribes. 
In exchange for firearms, whatever plunder or slaves are taken ―is 
divided into two portions, one of which belongs to Sheriff Sahib, the 
other to his Dyak colleagues.‖ 55  This contrasts with the oppressive 
systems of taxations the Arab or Malay rulers would enforce as they 
wished from their Dayak subjects, as opposed to these apportionments of 
goods shared across ethnicities, as described by Brooke.  
Along with the Serebas and Sakarran Dayaks, the Illanun were 
known to bring other ethnic groups into their communities. Their raids 
were in part extremely successful because of their ability to form 
temporary alliances and cooperate with local tribes of varied 
ethnicities who knew the region well: ―…young tribal warriors in search 
of adventure…particularly the Iban, or Sea Dyaks…often enlisted and 
served upon the Iranun raiding ships.‖ 56  Moreover, the Illanun would 
also draft sometimes unwilling local peoples into their crews as they 
went about their slave raids. 57  According to these descriptions, it 
seems that piratical communities are greatly benefited by 
heterogeneously ethnic communities as it aided their raiding 
capabilities. It also seems that these communities were perceived by 
outsiders as an opportunity to escape their normal lifestyle and life a 
life of adventure, and possibly have the opportunity to be in a more 
upwardly socially mobile should they prove themselves. 
Other authors offer evidence the Illanun social structure was 
upwardly mobile. Warren discusses their ―fluid social system‖ within 
the Illanun raiding parties: ―…a person who could manage to gain 
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followers and accumulate wealth…could rise into the office of orang 
kaya (as a local leader) or in rare instances into the rajah or datu 
class.‖ 58  He does note however that it was only extremely rare that 
commoners could rise into the highest echelons of the elite, though 
this is still more egalitarian than the structures of riverine Dayak 
and Malay communities. 
The piratical communities whom Brooke describes seemed to 
differentiate themselves both in their egalitarian nature, piratical 
activities, and social structures. The nature of mobile piracy in the 
region, which made necessary more geographically mobile communities, 
and knowledge of different regions seemed to create more ethnically 
egalitarian groups of local peoples. Individuals appeared to enjoy more 
social mobility than their counterparts in other groups as individuals 
who were able to gather followers around themselves through skilled 
raiding rose to prominence. In the Hobsbawmian sense, piratical 
characters like Si Rahman and others were mythologized during their 
lifetime or have since become part of Indonesia‘s oral tradition of 
mischievous robber heroes.59 
The cyclical nature of transitory power-holders in these maritime 
communities was accelerated and made unpredictable, in part because of 
the arrival of the British. Tarling makes a compelling argument that 
this external colonial power challenged the political rule of local 
power-holders, and the loss of state-driven commerce was contributive 
to increased marauding, thus leading to marauding and piracy that was 
motivated for private, as opposed to state-sponsored means as 
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individuals, as opposed to states, became powerful. 60 Brooke notes this 
as well, and explains that the undermined legitimacy of local Malay 
rule gave rise to piratical ―petty states.‖ 61  Rutter suggests that 
besides breaking up the political state structure, maritime raiding 
against European ships grew to take especially honorable connotations, 
and some piratical communities were established for the explicit 
purpose of raising British ships.62 
The entrance of a new external power-holder, the British, to 
Southeast Asia and Sarawak specifically seemed to affect the social 
structures and communities of Malay, Dayak, and Illanun pirates by 
bringing together disparate ethnicities into egalitarian community 
structures that were opportunistic, private-interest driven characters. 
Next, as this paper examines contemporary piracy, the entrance of a 
different player, the transnational criminal syndicate, has an 
alternative impact on Southeast Asian communities and social structures 
in the late 20th and early 21st century. 
 
GEOPOLITICAL PARALLELS IN CONTEMPORARY AND COLONIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA 
“A new generation is coming to power in Asia. Where their parents’ lives too often were 
defined by hunger, war, and revolution, Asia’s youth have grown up in the midst of the 
biggest economic boom in history.” – Through the Eyes of Tiger Cubs: Views of Asia’s Next 
Generation
63
 
*** 
Today, what was colonial British Malaya and the Dutch Indies are 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia and Malaysia are endowed 
with an abundance of natural resources and enjoy booming economic 
growth. Singapore is the financial hub of Asia, known for its skyline 
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and its fast-paced city life. Indonesia is the fourth most populous 
country, a founding member of ASEAN, a member of the G-20, and has the 
17th largest economy in the world.64 The region has made enormous strides 
in development in the past 150 years, but the region remains home to 
disenfranchised maritime peoples that have not participated in this 
economic growth. In many ways the region‘s geography, the nature of 
regional trade and the opportunity it represents for pirates, and 
transient political boundaries has created a macro-narrative similar to 
that of the colonial era, and that continues to enable piracy to 
flourish.  
The geography of Southeast Asia, and particularly the Straits of 
Malacca and the Indonesian and the Philippine coastlines, has been and 
continues to be a great enabler of piracy. The shoreline of the Straits 
of Malacca include hundreds of river mouths, swampy inlets, and 
countless tiny islands, reefs, and shoals; the geography of the strait 
made it almost impossible to secure in Brooke‘s time, and it remains so 
today. An IMB official recently commented that Philippines officials 
would need 10,000 patrol boats to secure their borders from modern day 
pirates, and that Indonesia would need at least as many. 65 Pirates can 
unexpectedly ambush ship, and their smaller craft can easily escape 
should a raid go wrong, whether one is steering a 19th-century prahu or 
21st-century speedboat. Not only is the geography particularly conducive 
to pirates, but the economic opportunity that draws them. 
Today, the 550 mile-long Straits of Malacca is the busiest sea 
route in the world, and the goods that traverse its waters drive Asian 
economies. Six hundred ships navigate the straits every day, and 
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annually 25% of the world‘s maritime commerce, and 50% of the world‘s 
oil, crosses the strait. 66 The Straits of Malacca have driven trade in 
the region for years, and this won‘t change any time soon, as the 
burgeoning tiger and tiger cub economies continue their rapid economic 
development. In the colonial period, the region was comparatively 
booming; ―spices drove the world economies…the way oil does today;‖ and 
the Indies were the capital of the spice market!67 While the contents of 
these ships‘ cargoes have changed, the scale of economic incentive has 
not altered for pirates. 
Finally, the political borders of the region, have and remain 
conducive to piracy because of the ample space to hide between borders, 
where state enforcement is lax, porous, or at odds with another state, 
which prevents for the enforcement of the borders. Through the colonial 
period, the region was characterized by unfixed and transient polities, 
governed by a multitude of power-holders like the riverine Malays and 
Dayaks. The Malays and Dayaks were further aided in their piratical 
activities as colonial states like the British and Dutch butted heads 
over sovereignty, and were unable to create a unified anti-piracy 
policy until the end of the 19th-century. 68 Historian Keith Taylor has 
likened the region to a ―succession of Thalassocrasies,‖ or ‗sovereigns 
of the sea‘ with mythical-historical examples being Minoan Crete or 
Ancient Phoenicia. 69  Today, in spite of a more rigid state structure, 
tensions between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have enabled modern 
day pirates to escape across borders. Even with the recent addition of 
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joint Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia patrols intended to deter piracy, 
patrols are merely coordinated, not collaborative, and ‗hot pursuit‘ of 
pirates into another nation‘s regional waters is disallowed. 70  The 
porous borders of the region, 200 years ago and today, has afforded 
individuals and communities to traverse outside the realm of 
traditional nation states and boundaries. 
 
THE RISE OF ASIAN CRIMINAL SYNDICATE, INC. 
“…Shipowners and their crews are becoming increasingly concerned about a relatively new, 
and far more sophisticated, sort of crime: the high-seas hijacking of ships and cargoes 
by well-organised, international crime syndicates.”71 
*** 
 In the past two decades, organized crime has grown significantly 
and changed structurally. This has enabled the advent of truly 
transnational criminal organizations, whose spheres of interests expand 
across international borders. Transnational organizations are defined 
by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation as: 
Any group having some manner of formalized structure and whose primary objective is to 
obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the 
use of violence or threats of violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, 
and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales or region of the 
country.
72
 
These changes have impacted the social structure of other non-
state dark economy actors such as pirates. Liss argues that the end of 
the cold war and accelerating globalization are responsible for this. 73 
In Asia specifically, home to some of the world‘s largest criminal 
organizations, the region‘s economic growth and trade in the 1980s has 
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been to the advantage of criminal organizations, and the economic 
opening of China and the 1997 Asian financial crisis have increased 
income inequality across the region and made recruiting for criminal 
organizations easier.74  
The political changes brought about by the collapse of the USSR 
and communist or communist-supported governments around the world 
created a breakdown of social orders and weakened central state power. 
This has enabled non-state actors to step into this power gap, 
especially in developing countries. Shadow economies in these regions 
grew increasingly influential and powerful as a result. 75  These 
international criminal organizations take advantage of advanced 
communication technologies that have made cooperation across borders 
and between different underground organizations much easier. Besides 
communication technologies, transportation technologies have advanced, 
which has allowed for the affordable and swift transportation of goods 
through the veins of the global economy.76  
As a result of the end of the cold war and accelerating 
globalization, criminal organizations like the Chinese triads and 
Japanese Yakuza have undergone structural changes which enable them to 
better take advantage of the 21st-century stage. Criminal organizations 
have transformed themselves into ―loose networks of semi-autonomous 
criminal entrepreneurs,‖ with varying degrees of connection. 77 Williams 
suggests that the structure of ―criminal organisations have developed 
to resemble that of transnational corporations, who treat national 
borders as nothing more than minor inconveniences to their criminal 
                                                          
74
 Ibid. 174 
75
 Ibid. 174 
76
 Ibid. 177 
77
 Ibid. 177. 
 
 
enterprises.‖78 Liss notes however that the ―core‖ communities of these 
networks or ―organizers‖ are characterized by close relationships 
amongst members, and typifies these organizations as less hierarchical 
than their predecessors. 79  But while these organizations may be less 
hierarchical than the monolithic structure of the yesteryear Chinese 
triad, for players at the bottom rung, where the actual individuals who 
carry out acts of piracy fall, their position in this new community 
might be compared with the relationship seasonal workers have with a 
faceless corporation. From firsthand accounts of reporters in the 
region in interviews with individuals who are parts of these piratical 
or criminal syndicate organizations, their positions do not seem to be 
less hierarchical Their social structures contrast starkly with the 
independent pirate communities of Sarawak, which seemed to be typified 
by close-knit social structure bound together by the livelihood of 
piracy.  
 
PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY 
―We were approaching the oil tanker and one of the pirates with a gun in his hand told 
our interpreter to shut up, or something like that…well all I know is that he said 
something to our interpreter and he started shitting bricks…at that points I knew we were 
losing a lot in translation.‖ – David Crabtree, interview with Miles Bird
80
  
*** 
While the British and Dutch and the efforts of individuals like 
James Brooke and his successors in large part had eradicated Southeast 
Asian maritime piracy by the late 19th century, opportunistic raiding in 
one form or another remained in the region until World War II. 81 After 
the war, while piracy was ―no longer supported and organized by entire 
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maritime communities and states,‖ 82  opportunistic raiding resumed. It 
was not until the 1980s, though, that international organizations like 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), as well as state-players, began to seriously take 
note of, and respond to issues of piracy.83  
From the mid-1980s to early 2000s, Southeast Asia saw a large 
surge in acts of maritime piracy. This contemporary maritime piracy 
came in many forms. Young proposes a typology of piracy that 
―corresponds to an escalating scale of risk and return. As the risk and 
potential return increase so do the threat and degree of violence…[and] 
so does the apparent degree of organization of attackers.‖ 84  At the 
bottom of this spectrum are low-end, opportunistic acts of piracy, 
which in Southeast Asia might take the shape of ―inhabitants of remote 
islands…ganging up to attack ships for food and cigarettes.‖85 These are 
the most common, and attacks against local fishermen constitute the 
majority of the victims as well as perpetrators. In the middle of the 
typology are Ronnie, Big Boy, Ariel, Tony, and Hassan, the crew of a 
22-meter outrigger in the Philippines that ―attacks cargo ships, tugs, 
fishing boats…they take whatever they can – cargo, watches, jewelry, 
money.‖ 86  These pirates may seize large vessels for short periods of 
time and hold crews hostage; they are more organized, but remain mostly 
opportunistic.  
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At the far end of the Southeast Asian pirate typology are the 
pirates and communities which this paper will investigate. The seizure 
of the Petro Ranger on April 16th 1998 is a case study in the form of 
piracy these individuals engage. 12 heavily armed men boarded the Petro 
Ranger via speedboat, and the lead pirate took the captain hostage, 
explaining that he ―worked for a multinational syndicate with bosses in 
Indonesia, Singapore, China and Hong Kong.‖ 87  Had it not been for a 
nearby Chinese patrol boat which boarded the tanker and subsequent 
capture of the pirates, the Petro Ranger and its cargo would have 
likely have disappeared and been sold on the black market by the 
clients of these pirates. The lead pirate‘s description of his 
employment subtly hints at the aforementioned discussion of loosely 
structured groups that now constitute criminal organizations. 
By the 1990s, piracy in the region had escalated to serious 
levels. In the 1990s, almost 75% of the world‘s pirate attacks took 
place in the Southeast Asia region, and the waters around Indonesia 
account for nearly 33% of global piracy attacks. 88 The IMB Piracy 
Reporting Center (PRC) was established in Kuala Lumpur in October 1992 
and since then liaised with the various private and public sector 
interests on piracy issues. According to the IMB data from 1992 to 
2006, acts of actual and attempted piracy in the Southeast Asia and 
Bangladesh region range from a low of 15 in 1993 to a high of 292 in 
2000. 89 As noted earlier, piracy in the region tends to fall across a 
spectrum, and while the vast majority of attacks fall in the low-end of 
the spectrum of organization and scale of attack. The most 
organizationally complex acts of piracy and their communities will be 
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examined, just as Dayak and Illanun acts of piracy against the British 
were at the top of their respective spectrum of organizational 
complexity within the communities of their time.  
 
ASIAN CRIMINAL SYNDICATES: CORPORATE, NOT EGALITARIAN 
“Four Asian syndicates, with mafia-style dons in Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong 
and mainland China, are reckoned to have the right amount of transnational sophistication 
to make money from high-seas piracy on a regular basis. One syndicate is thought to be 
headed by an Indonesian tycoon who was one of form President Suharto’s closest business 
pals.” – South Sea Piracy: Dead Men Tell No Tales, The Economist90 
*** 
As Liss and others have examined, organized crime around the 
world has grown increasingly corporate. In Asia, these ―mafia- dons‖ 91 
have adapted new social structures that fit the nature of their 
transnational operations in the 21st century. The corporate nature of 
these criminal syndicates manifests itself in a variety of ways.  
The interests of true transnational criminal syndicates are 
driven for financial reasons, and served by the individuals or 
organizations that are willing to be engaged in a contractual or 
partnered relationship. As Galeotti notes, leaders in criminal 
organizations, no longer ―give orders so much as have greater assets 
with which to purchase or compel the assistance of others within the 
network.‖ 92 In the context of 21st century Asian piracy, the leader of 
the gang of 12 that boarded the Petro Ranger is an example an agent 
that would serve these criminal organizations. According to the IMB, a 
shipping vessel can be ordered from a local group of Filipino pirates 
such as the Petro Ranger hijackers, likely through a broker, and for a 
price tag of $300,000 will be hijacked and delivered to the desired 
location of the client. The Isla Luzon, hijacked off the Philippine 
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coast in 1989 and later discovered trading in East Asia under the name 
Nigel is another example of this.93  
Jhonny Batam, a self-described ―gentleman of opportunity‖ who 
works with Chinese crime syndicates explains the nature of his deal 
flow. First, a ship broker reaches out to him with a client interested 
in diesel fuel, for example. Next, Batam will call a contact of his on 
a tanker, and solicit their interest in getting involved. Finally, if 
interested, Batam will put together a team to execute the enterprise.
94
 
Batam is like a commodities broker on behalf of the client, the. He is 
contracted as a service provider. His work with multiple Chinese 
syndicates indicates the previously described loosely-structured groups 
that make up these criminal organizations.  
It may be helpful to look at the compensation of modern day 
pirates to understand their role in transnational criminal syndicates. 
In an interview with the Straits Times, Sastra Genting explained that 
he worked as a cleaner on an oil tanker, and was paid a set sum of 
$30,000 to pass on ―the vessel‘s planned route, number of crew on 
board, their schedule and responsibilities and also [take] pictures of 
the ship.‖ 95  Genting explained that he passed this information to his 
boss, who he only knows by Pang, and he does not know if the ship was 
even attacked. This seems to indicate that his compensation is less 
based on the set portion of a successful robbery, and more akin to an 
agreed upon payment or wage for a service. In another case, Sastra 
assisted in the hijacking of a ship, Sastra and his fellow hijackers 
received $20,000 and further explained ―the big boss gets profit from 
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the oil he sells.‖ 96  This further hints that the relationship between 
the criminal syndicate and these pirates is similar to a contracted 
service provider than a partner in an operation. Moreover, even if in 
these cases or other cases a share system is more clear, the size and 
scope of the hijackings, where the net-worth of a boat and cargo are 
between $5 and $15 million, compensation, even in the tens of thousands 
of dollars, is not so much a share but a miniscule portion of the value 
of the operation.  
Phantom ships are another example of what this altered, 
‗professionalized‘ social structure enables. Phantom ships are ships 
that offer attractively priced services in a port, and upon securing a 
client and cargo, will leave the port and make off with the cargo, 
simply repainting and reregistering itself. As recently as 2007 IMB 
officials stated that, new cases of phantom ship incidents were being 
reported once every three weeks, and had been following an upward 
trend. In a good year, a phantom ship can earn between $40 and $50 
million for a criminal syndicate.97 The IMB estimated that phantom ship 
schemes resulted in the loss of at least $200 million in 2000, and the 
number is likely much larger today. The vast majority of this wealth, 
if structured in deals similar to major ship hijackings, goes to the 
closed inner circles of these highly organized criminal organizations, 
while the local pirates are effectively paid a wage for their services.  
Among other reasons, the extreme wealth of the criminal bosses of 
these organizations makes these individuals extremely difficult to 
convict. As a Philippine Coast Guard member explains: ―These people are 
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rich, they can afford to bribe lawyers.‖ 98 An example of one of these 
high-net worth individuals would be previously mentioned ‗business pal‘ 
of Suharto. This business pal is most likely Indonesian tycoon Anthony 
Salim, who is one of former President Suharto‘s close business 
relations. 99  Salim‘s net worth was estimated to be approximately $5.2 
billion in 2012, and he is the chairman of the Salim group, Indonesia‘s 
largest conglomerate.100  
Prominent figures like Salim have not been officially implicated 
in any courts of justice, and it seems unlikely that they will be, 
given their connections, wealth, and the loose structure of criminal 
enterprise which does not leave room for Salim to be caught red-handed 
on the deck of a pirated vessel. These individuals control their 
massive operations ―from a great distance – for example from an office 
building in Hong Kong, Singapore, or Manila, or from a flashy brothel 
or golf course on the Indonesian island of Batam.‖101 As noted in a 1999 
Economist article, two extremely similar high-profile hijackings of the 
Alondra Rainbow in October 1999 and the Tenu earlier that year indicate 
that while the pirates of the events themselves have been arrested, and 
even a supposed leader behind the attacks, the ―mastermind‖ has not 
been apprehended.102  
An Illanun or Dayak raid upon a British ship might have been 
composed of 100 men across a number of boats. A similar number of 
individuals may, in one form or another, play a role in the pirating a 
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ship in the Straits of Malacca today, from the different brokers to the 
small gangs that pirate ships. It is clear, however, that the nature of 
the community which surrounds these operations is much different. 
Galeotti notes that one result of such loosely-connected criminal 
networks might include a loss of loyalty within the group resulting 
from increased ethnic diversity. 103  Successful collaboration amongst 
colonial era figures across ethnic lines indicates that some social 
structures can overcome these boundaries, and while modern-day 
transnational criminal organizations successfully execute inter-ethnic 
operations, their community structure is such that it establishes a 
contractual, business relationship as opposed to a partnership.  
 
BATAM, AND OTHER MODERN DAY “PIRATE TOWNS” 
“The plot was hatched in a Batam coffee shop, Ariffin says, when a Malaysian shipping 
executive approached an Indonesian sailor named Lukman and inquired whether he could 
organize a crew to hijack the tanker.” – The organizing of the Nepline Delima hijacking104 
*** 
Just as in Brooke‘s day, communities of modern day ―pirate bases‖ 
exist in the 21st century. 105  In Southeast Asia, Batam like it is the 
most well-known of these. However, unlike Brooke‘s communities, Batam 
and others cannot be characterized as true communities as labor pools 
for brokers like Batam. For the most part, these communities are areas 
where the service providers of transnational criminal organizations 
recruit low-income Southeast Asians into piratical activities. 
Batam is located seven miles south of Singapore, described by a 
visitor as the ―dark sister‖ to ―Southeast Asia‘s Cinderalla,‖ 
Singapore, and by Warren as the capital of the region‘s ―dark alliance 
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between triad-linked figures and space-age pirate gangs.‖106107 The island 
is ideally situated near the strait of Singapore and South China Sea, 
and 65,000 ships pass by the island each year.108 Until the 1980s, Batam 
was nothing more than an under-populated fishing community, until an 
Indonesian entrepreneur and close friend of President Suharto‘s sought 
to transform Batam into a tariff-free zone that would attract 
investment and entrepreneurial opportunity. Batam‘s rule of law, unlike 
Singapore‘s proved weak, and while developers built golf courses, 
casinos, and strip malls, it also attracted gangsters, smugglers, and 
prostitutes.  
Following the 1997 financial crisis, the situation in Batam took 
a turn for the worse. High unemployment rates on the island drove move 
people into the black economy. This has made recruiting for pirate 
syndicate operations much easier, according to IMB and shipping 
officials. 109  Batam, the ―gentleman of opportunity,‖ explains the 
euphemism the word ―coffee shop‖ serves on the island for the many 
―gambling dens where seamen meet brokers, trade gossip, drink beer, and 
bet a numbers game.‖ 110 Batam goes onto explain how Batam residents who 
carry out piratical activities operate as men for hire, networking in 
‗coffee shops‘ in search of the next operation. It is from this labor 
pool of unemployed low-income mariners and strongmen that criminal 
syndicates recruit for their business. 
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The pirate community of Batam differs significantly from the 
pirate communities during Brooke‘s reign. Batam provides an open labor 
pool that brokers for international criminal organizations use to carry 
out their assignments. These low-income pirates seem to be effectively 
be ‗contract‘ or ‗seasonal‘ employees who are paid an agreed upon sum 
for their services. The pirate towns of Sarawak were organized around 
their charismatic men of leadership, religious affiliation, and 
familial ties. Batam pirates are effectively at the bottom of the 
loosely structured hierarchy of transnational criminal organizations, 
as well as within the state and their own communities that look down 
upon them as they largely remain in the same social strata.  
These modern day pirates that operate out of Batam also seem 
distinct from Hobsbawm‘s social bandit. Hobsbawm‘s social bandit is 
oppressed or exploited by individuals or institutions that are more 
powerful than him. In a sense, Batam‘s pirates are employed by 
institutional transnational criminal organizations that exploit them. 
Hobsbawm‘s bandit is not an interesting figure economically, but 
because of the ―illumination [he] sheds on his situation within the 
rural society.‖111 While the wages of these low-income individually have 
little impact outside of the brothels and karaoke bars they frequent, 
their actions relatively are much larger than their colonial 
counterparts, as contemporary piracy numbers in the billions of 
dollars. 112  Moreover, the head of the organization is a figure who is 
incredibly interesting from an economic perspective. Hobsbawm‘s pirates 
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are also ―as important to their people as Napoleons or Bismarks.‖ 113 In 
contrast, according to Crabtree in his visit to the village where he 
met the pirates he would later go on a raid with in 2006, nearly all of 
the villagers in the community spoke of these men with great fear, even 
though this was the very community in which they lived. In the past, 
some residents had turned members of their own community into the 
police, and though they were released for lack of evidence, this 
contrasts to the relationship a social bandit has with his community.114  
 
LANUN 
“Though his jailers remain unsure who he is, they know exactly what he is: lanun. When 
asked for a direct English equivalent, an interpreter explains that there is none, that 
it is a word freighted with many layers of culture and history. The short, imperfect 
answer is: The prisoner is a pirate.” – Peter Gwin, National Geographic, 2007115 
*** 
As the quote above indicates, ‗lanun,‘ or ‗Illanun‘ is still a 
term used today to describe pirates. Few historians or security 
analysts have contributed to comparative studies between the colonial 
and contemporary piracy phenomenon in Southeast Asia. Almost completely 
nonexistent in the historical literature is a comparative analysis 
viewed through a social or Hobsbawmian lens.  
This socio-historical, comparative view is important for two 
reasons. First, for the historian, the unique geography of the Straits 
of Malacca not only provides snapshots of piracy from different time 
periods, but an opportunity to analyze the piratical continuum in the 
evolving nature of nation-states and economic players within unchanging 
geographic boundaries and economic incentives for piracy. Second, for 
the security-minded reader, the majority of dialogue today is 
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restricted, with perspectives heavily reliant on individuals and 
institutions with legal, economic, or policing backgrounds. While this 
analytical approach is important when combating piracy, security 
measures will ultimately be unsuccessful if they do not address the 
social pressures that encourage piracy in the region. A socio-
historical perspective can provide those insights.  
While geography, economics, and the nature of political borders 
in the region remain similar, there are a myriad of differences 
inherent in these two time periods, among them technological, cultural, 
and the transition away from the colonial state-system to the modern 
states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. As one would expect, the 
pirates of Brooke‘s time, described in his personal letters and 
according to the literature which describes them today, are distinct 
from modern-day pirates in a myriad of ways. Both time periods, 
however, underwent their respective experience upon the entrance of a 
new and significant external power-holder into the social structure: 
the British and the transnational criminal organization. The British 
and the transnational criminal organization have had different impacts 
on the local communities that are already external to the local power 
structure and operate in ‗dark economies‘ of sorts.  
Brooke‘s descriptions of the piratical Dayaks and Illanun 
communities in his personal letters indicate social communities 
independent from the power structures of both the Malayan ruling 
classes in the region that had been present prior to Brooke‘s arrival, 
and Brooke‘s attempts at social order. Opportunistic maritime raiding 
and piracy has a deep history in Southeast Asia and existed long before 
the appearance of corporatized criminal organizations. Both of these 
forces supported the development of new and alternate social structures 
 
 
that are external to the state powers of their respective time periods. 
In both cases, these social communities were less dependent upon ethnic 
considerations than their peer communities. However, for modern-day 
pirates, their communities seem to be less driven by communal 
egalitarianism and opportunities for upward social mobility. They have 
become contractors within a community that does not afford the 
individual on the lowest rung of the economic ladder the benefits that 
communities outside the jurisdiction of the state-system provide, other 
than a salary. 
To Hobsbawm, bandits are interesting because they offer insight 
into the mind of the peasantry; Indonesia‘s pirates do not seem to be, 
or are even perceived as such social bandits, even if they come from a 
similar socioeconomic background. Rather, these individuals are 
perceived as common thugs by their fellow fishermen, and pirates, 
terrorists, and in the last few decades, as menacing members of 
international crime syndicates by the international community. But 
while they are perceived as such, they are not true ‗members‘ or these 
organizations, and do not seem to incur the benefits as such. The 
membership of these organizations is now closed to its tightest inner 
circle, which ironically may play significant roles within state-
systems and structures, as the example of Anthoni Salim seems to 
indicate. The Salim‘s of today, while perhaps known by some to be 
connected to such sinister organizations, continue to reap the benefits 
as of significant power-holders both within and without the state 
system without the negative affiliation. 
 Indonesia‘s national motto, ―Bhinneka Tunggal Ika,‖ articulates 
the diversity of cultures, ethnicities, and languages that shape the 
 
 
country. The phrase, means, literally ―unity in diversity.‖ 116  As 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries in the region 
cement their positions as a significant economic and political 
stakeholders, in the Southeast Asia region, it is important to 
understand the history perhaps states should take heed to offer 
political representation to avoid their citizens‘ move to the 
alternative allegiance of the mob. 
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